Japanese-SovietRussian Relations since 1945 by Kimie Hara

Author:Kimie Hara [Hara, Kimie]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Social Science, Ethnic Studies, General, Regional Studies
ISBN: 9781134647255
Google: OggQZ1qd4uIC
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2003-09-02T04:39:33+00:00

The Soviet ‘nyet’ to the ‘unsolved problems’

When the Japanese side claimed that Brezhnev had confirmed inclusion of the ‘Northern Territories problem’ among the ‘unsolved problems’ mentioned in the Joint Communiqué, the Soviet representative adamantly denied it. Wherever the truth lay, the fact is that the Soviet position had returned to the former rigid one that no territorial problem existed between the two countries. Why did flexibility disappear from the Soviet position? Panov suggests that the Moscow summit failed despite Soviet readiness to confirm the transfer of Shikotan and the Habomais, because of strong military opposition. He said that, just before the summit, Defence Minister Grechko reversed his attitude, and opposed the islands’ transfer to Japan on strategic grounds. Khrushchev had regarded these islands as strategically unimportant in the nuclear age. However, the strategic environment around the Kuriles changed in the 1970s.106 Especially considering the strong influence of the military of that time, this view of the military opposition to the islands’ transfer seems to be valid.

Panov describes another view, perhaps more reliable, as the source attended the Moscow summit. According to this account, Brezhnev became very angry at Tanaka’s attitude when he stated the Japanese position, as Tanaka curtly told Brezhnev to take notes of what he would state about the Japanese position and understand the reasons for Japan’s not giving up the ‘four islands’ demand. The meeting having started in such an undiplomatic manner, Brezhnev was said to have decided not to discuss any possibility of returning to the position of the 1956 Joint Declaration.107 If this account is true, it was probably either one of the exceptional cases where Brezhnev took a decision by himself, or Tanaka’s attitude produced an immediate consensus among the top leaders. Whatever the truth of either explanation, the Japanese side, however, still asserts that Brezhnev in fact recognised the existence of the territorial problem. According to a former MID senior official who attended the meeting,

Tanaka all the time demanded that Brezhnev recognise that there was a territorial problem between Japan and the Soviet Union. Though Brezhnev refused, Tanaka today, tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow all the time said ‘Well, you tell there is [sic]’. After all, he [Brezhnev] once unofficially said ‘All right, I know!’. But afterwards we confirmed that it was not written in any document.108

With regard to the last point, another former MID official who was in the secretariat told me it was his personal view that when Brezhnev met Tanaka, no member of the secretariat such as himself attended the meeting. As a result, there was no record left with the Soviet side. The other individuals who attended the meeting were all in senior positions; they did nothing but listen, and took no notes. There is consequently no way to confirm whether or not Brezhnev said ‘Da’.109

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